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Abstract
This article looks into the night lights of North Korea and their relationship to prosperity shining.
The first  introductory section  discusses  the  political  economy of  North Korea.  It  highlights  its
strengths and shortcomings. The second section introduces to new methods of geo-spatial micro and
macro econometric analysis. The following night lights analysis is based on near real-time big data.
It includes high-resolution remote-sensing and satellite imagery from the NASA (Earth Obervatory)
Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor on the Suomi NPP satellite. The third
and  fourth  section  address  important  issues  related  to  North  Korea's  prices,  co-optation  and
mobilization of anger. The final section deals with problems in public policy administration. 
Keywords:  North  Korea,  Varieties  of  Capitalism,  Night  Lights,  Satellite  Imagery,  Political
Economy, public policy administration, buyngjing line.
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Introduction: The Political Economy of North Korea 
North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - DPRK) is characterized by a military-
intensive political economy with associated form of capitalism. The  buyngjing line introduced in
2013  coupled  policies  aimed  at  nuclear  development  with  socio-economic  growth  programs
(Haggard 2017, p.4). The path-breaking work of Hall and Soskice (2001) on Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) identifies crucial institutional complementarities of the capitalist system, as well as important
comparative institutional advantages, which affect system stability or change (Hall 2006). These, in
turn,  shed light  on the economic vulnerabilities that each different variety of capitalism entails
(Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). 
The communist apparatus and the military-industrial complex of North Korea is the key driver of
what can be described a State-Interfered Planned Market Economy, in which political and military
elites  not  only  capture  resources  but  also  redistribute  benefits  among  the  population  (see  also
Cerami and Stubbs 2013). As in the United States, military investments and spending determine the
contemporary foreign policy of the country, resulting in an escalating “nuclear race agenda-setting”.
Similarly to the case of the USA-Soviet Union space race of the 1960s, these are expensive political
exercises that in some way have to be financed. Funds can only be raised at this point either from a
reduction in expenditures for those policies indirectly aimed at subsidizing the economy and, hence,
at raising living standards (such as price subsidies or subvention to modernize the firms) or, as last
resort, from an increase in trade or external debt. The latter is, clearly, no more a feasible option
because of  embargos. The third and the last  remaining option has therefore been a continuous
increase in military production and exports, as well as a realignment towards new trade partners,
notably China, South Korea, the Russian Federation and associated new satellite states. 
Beside human development shortcomings, the systemic problems present in North Korea can be
summarized into six main groups: 
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 presence of not fully developed infrastructures (such as in the electricity sector);
 oil-dependence; 
 reduced export-led and import-led growth opportunities; 
 shortcomings in the correct exploitation and redistribution of resources; 
 persistence  of  bad  governance  and,  in  particular,  of  military-political  capture;  and,  as
mentioned,
 a military-spending foreign-dependent based economy. 
A recent report by the Bank of [South] Korea (2017) revealed in 2016: 1) a real annual GDP growth
of 3.9 percent; 2) an increase in agriculture, forestry and fishing sector by 2.5 percent; 3) a rise in
mining production by 8.4 percent; 4) an expansion in electricity, gas and water production by 22.3
percent; 5) a growth in building construction and civil engineering by 1.2 percent; and 6) a gain in
the services sector by 0.6 percent (see Noland 2017; see also Table 1 and Table 2).  In 2017, as a
result of nuclear escalation,  real annual GDP decreased, instead, by 3.5 percent.  Production in the
agriculture, forestry & fishing sector decreased by 1.3 percent, mining production by 11.0 percent,
manufacturing  production  by  6.9  percent,  electricity,  gas  &  water  production  by  2.9  percent,
construction by 4.4 percent. The service sector increased by only 0.5 percent. North Korean GNI
per capita was equal only 4.4 percent the one of South Korea (Bank of Korea 2018, pp. 1-6).
As argued in the 2017 report, "bilateral trade between South and North Korea decreased by 87.7
percent year-on-year to record 0.33 billion dollars in 2016", whilst the trade between China and
North Korea in 2015 corresponded to approximately 80 percent of total trade (Bank of Korea 2017).
In 2017, external trade further decreased (Bank of South Korea 2018).
As  a  translation  of  the Korean  Trade  Investment  Promotion  Agency  (KOTRA) Report,  which
provided adjusted and revised data, has unmasked, from 2014 to 2016, North Korea’s trade exports
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increased by 4 percent (from $3,164.6 million in 2014 to $2,820.9 million in 2016). Imports grew
by 4 percent  (from $4,446.2 in  2014 to $3,725.7  million  in  2016.  In  2016,  North  Korea  had,
however, a negative trade balance of -5.4 percent ($-904,786,000 USD in 2016). North Korea’s
export with China increased from $582,521,000 in 2007 to $2,634,402,000 in 2016. But its imports
overcame the exports, increasing from $1,392,453,000 in 2007 to $3,422,035,000 in 2016. In 2016,
North  Korea’s  top  trading  partners  were  China,  Russia,  India,  Thailand,  Philippines,  Pakistan,
Luxembourg,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and  Sri  Lanka  (see  Boydston  2017).  South  Korea's  trade
partnerships lagged behind. 
According to calculations made by MIT researchers (2018), in 2015, North Korea’s main exports
consisted of coal briquettes, non-knit men’s coats, non-knit men’s suits, non-knit women’s coats,
and non-knit women’s suits. Sea-fishes and molluscs also figured prominently in the list of exports.
Imports consisted, instead, of refined petroleum, synthetic filament yarn wozen, delivery trucks,
soybean oil and broadcasting equipment.  
The dollarization and (Chinese  Yuan) Renminbization of the economy (see  Park 2017, p.67) has
resulted in  unprecendeted growth,  but  it  has  also created  serious  vulnerabilities  because  of  the
embargos,  with  associated  human  and  health  costs.  Similarly,  military  spending  in  2014
corresponded to 24 percent of GDP (USD 2016), though its real volume is likely to have increased
in 2016 due to the "nuclear space race". 
As Haggard (2017) has argued, North Korea has undergone a “marketization from below” that has
witnessed the development of private initiative and some lessening of government involvement.
This,  however,  has  occurred  in  a  state-interfered  and  still  planned  market  economy.  The
development of formal General Markets side by side to a growth of the informal jangmadang has
slowly gone out of state control. This has involved a variety of market segments, among which
consumer goods, services, real estate, financial services, etc. (Haggard 2017, p. 7). 
As the report by Daily NK (2017) has shown, there are approximately 612,661 stalls across all
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General Markets over a population of 24,851,267, distributed in 66 urban areas, 147 counties, 66
districts and three larger districts.  Competition between state and private providers has emerged
(Park 2017, pp.22, 44). 
It is important to note that North Korea is highly dependent on oil and gas imports, as well as on the
exports  of  consumer  goods  and  military  equipments.  As Nölke  and  Vliegenthart (2009)  have
argued for the case of former communist countries in Europe, North Korea can be described also as
a ‘dependent market economy’.  Taking into account Hall's (2017) work on the demand-led and
supply-side  led  economies  of  Europe,  North  Korea  is  characterized  by  three  dangerously
contrasting  political  economy  models  with  associated  institutional  complementarities and
comparative institutional dis/advantages: 
(1) a military-led political economy dependent on exports in the industrial-military complex;
(2) an import-led political economy dependent on the imports of oil and gas and/or other socio-
technical  advancement  equipments  (such  as  bio-technologies  in  the  health  care  or
agricultural sector) (see Haggard and Noland 2017); and 
(3) export-led political economy dependent on the exports of minerals, textiles, agricultural
and fishery products.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
Needless  to  say,  should  a  system  transformation  occur,  a  dramatic  change  in  the  strategic
coordination of labor and wages (see also Kollmorgen et al. 2015; and Dolata 2013), as well as in
trade realignment, becomes necessary. This also implies the emergence of new social classes. For
5
example, the Donju (money masters) (Park 2017, p.57) are the North Korean nouveaux riches, who
can  be  compared  to  the  oligarchs  of  the  Russian  Federation:  individuals  who  acquire  a
disproportionate amount of wealth and therefore are able to pursue both private income-generating
and foreign policy objectives. 
North  Korea  is  a  coastal  and  could  be  a high  opportunity  economy (see  Ndulu  et  al. 2008)
dependent on oil and gas. Its main future trading partners are likely to become China, the Russian
Federation and South Korea, whose realignment will also depend on oil and gas partnerships and
associated dependencies (Ross 2012; Cerami 2013).
Geo-Spatial Analysis1
The Mount Paektu (2,744 m; 9,003 ft) in the China-North Korean border (see Fig. 1 and 2) is a
tourist attraction, but also a sacred mountain (National Geographic 2016). It is the home of tigers,
bears, wolves and other wild animals. For North Koreans, it is addressed as the birth place of the
mythical founder of the first Korean kingdom - King Dangun (4,350 years ago) (Smith and Kim
2018) and later the historical revolutionary site, which gave birth to Kim Jong-un's father, Kim
Jong-il.  The  Paektu  bloodline  (Paektu  descendent)  includes  mythological,  as  well  as  political
connotations.  The  ‘Chosun  Tiger’  (or  Gojoseon  Tiger)  and  the  bear-woman  represent,
simoultaneosly,  mythological  sacred  wilde  animals  of  this  strato-volcano,  as  well  as  important
figures in state-formation. Kim Jong-un could, in this case, be seen as the "Chosun Tiger" of North
Korean  nation  building.  Kim  Jong-un's  wife  -  Ri  Sol-ju  -  and  sister  -  Kim  Yo-jong  -  (both
differently associated to the Mt. Paektu bloodline) play in North Korean politics different roles
associated with the Bear-woman (UMG 2018).
1 A more detailed geo-spatial analysis with interactive graphs and images is available at Story Maps:
Geo-Spatial Analysis North Korea https://arcg.is/0vrrje
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[Fig, 1 and 2 about here]
In  recent  years,  new methods  of  geo-spatial  micro  and macro  econometric  analysis  have  been
developed  based  on  near  real-time  big  data.  These  include  high-resolution NASA  Earth
Observatory remote-sensing  satellite  imagery  where  single  pixels  become  the  smallest  units  of
scientific enquiry. NASA nighttime lights are derived from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer
Suite (VIIRS)2 sensor on the SUOMI NPP satellite3. Data involve the average visible band digital
number  of  cloud-free  light  detections  multiplied  by  the  percent  frequency  of  light  detection.
Variations  are  normalized  so  as  to  avoid  fires  and  background  noises.  A special  algorithm is
developed to remove remaining clouds' and snows' shades.
New ad hoc macro- and micro econometric measures of human, economic and market activity can,
in this way, be obtained. This analysis can provide useful insights on current GDP and GDP growth,
or "True GDP" Growth and the size of the informal economy (Medina and Schneider 2018), current
and future income growth, presence of roads and infrastructures, wealth of cities, urban versus rural
divides, the effects of diseases on growth (such as malaria), growth at the coast versus the interior.
Computer-based  satellite  imagery  analysis  can  also  be  useful  to  natural  resource  discovery,
pollution, as well as in identifying building types, agricultural land use, monitoring climate and
weather,  etc.  (see Henderson  et  al.  2012; Donaldson  and  Storeygard  2016; Leitzell  2012).  For
Leitzell (2012), nighttime lights  can here be understood as a proxy of economic prosperity and
shining, which can be defined as   “the condition of being successful or thriving, especially with
reference  to economic  well-being”4.  The  night  time  light  photos  incorporate,  therefore,  a  huge
variety of human, economic, trade and development information. Light shining is also a scene of
human action, economicable and bankable human activity, human and economic dynamism, vitality
2 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html
3 https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/
4 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prosperity
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and vibrance, socio-technical advancement, “net progress”, and human socialization. For example,
investigating how energy consumption behaviors vary across different cultural settings, Román and
Stokes (2015) have succeeded to shed new light on the cultural patterns according to which cities
and “people illuminate the night” and their life (such as during he Christmas and New Year’s season
and the Holy  Month of Ramadan). The number and the intensity of lights is, in fact, very often
associated to the wealth of a city and of a nation (think, for example, to Paris or New York night
lights).
Over  the  period  1992-2011,  analysis  by Leitzell  (2012)  and Haggard and Pope (2014a,b,c)  on
luminosity changes has shown the existence of huge intra-country regional disparities, urban-rural
divides, and inbalances in city lights per capita. 
More recent analysis  has revealed that huge differences between South Korea and North Korea
persist over the period 2012-2018. Seoul’s night lights shine, though to a lesser extent than before.
Night lights development ("True" GDP development) in Pyongyang lags behind (see almost not-
visible  shining  point  north  of  Seoul).  From  March  2017  to  March  2018,  prosperity  shining
decreased in South Korea and continued to decrease in North Korea as a result of the "nuclear space
race". 
More in details, between 2012 and 2016, Pyongyang slightly expanded its prosperity shining in the
center of the city, though this happened at the expenses of the neighboring areas (see Fig. 3 and Fig.
4).  This  was caused by new real-estate investments  for  cadres  in  the center (the so-called The
Pyonghattan project). 
From March 2017 to March 2018, prosperity shining decreased in Pyongyang from 248.2 sq KM in
March 2017 to 136.9 sq KM in March 2018. The zones of highest prosperity shining decreased
from 60 sq KM in 2017 to 1.5 sq KM in March 2018 (see figs.  3-10).  The main human and
economic  activity  remained  concentrated  in  the  center  of  the  city  (se  fig.  11).  Embargos  and
reduced trade activity were the main causes for this decrease in “True” GDP.
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[Fig,  3, 4, 5, 6, 6a, 7, 7a, 8, 8a, 9, 9a, 10, 10a, 11 about here]
More in-depth geo-spatial  macro-  and micro- econometric  analysis  on local  human and market
activity has highlighted the different levels of North Korea's economic growth: national, regional
and local (more detailed analysis with interactive graphs and images is available at Story Maps:
Geo-Spatial Analysis North Korea  https://arcg.is/0vrrje). It has also shown that city development
policies must take into account different neighborhood’s development lights of human and market
activities, with associated prosperity shining and shortcomings. The cost of living in Pyongyang, as
of October 12, 2017, has exponentially risen. A monthly rent for 85 m2 in a normal area was about
2,800,000 KPW ($1 is about 8,000 KPW), whilst  in an expensive area was equal to 4,213,490
KPW. 1 liter of fat milk was 392 KPW. 12 eggs large costed 790 KPW. 500 grams of local cheese
4,460 KPW. 1 bottle of red table wine (good quality) 2,009 KPW. Bread (not brioches) for 2 people
for 1 day 356 KPW. 1 month internet (8 Mbps) 49,300 KPW. 40” flat screen TV 100,000 KPW. 1
summer dress in high street store (Zara, etc.) 67,790 KPW. 1 liter of gas 786 KPW. 1 Volkswagen
Golf 1.4 TSI 150 CV (or equivalent) 36,000,000 KPW. 1 Monthly ticket public transport 54,042
KPW.  1  box  of  antibiotics  (12  doses)  50,868  KPW.  4  rolls  of  toilet  paper  3,103  KPW
(Source: Expatistan.com 20175). 
Ageing Population and the Politics of Mortality
Because  of  ongoing  and  complex  processes  of  political,  economic,  cultural  and  societal
restructuring,  where new social  risks  emerge (Armingeon and Bonoli  2006),  the challenges  for
North Korea are even more serious and pressing than the ones that other Western nations are called
upon to face.  North Korea is  not only confronted with similar  demographic pressures as other
Western societies  are (such as ageing population).  It  is  also forced to deal with more dramatic
5 https://www.expatistan.com/cost-of-living
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systemic problems. They stem, on the one hand, from the transition from a centrally planned to a
mixed-central planned market economy. On the other, they derive from the negative occurences that
the North Korean population is called urpon to deal with because of war threats and the escalation
of nuclear proliferation activities. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (see Linz
and Stepan 1996; also O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986) become here more pressing. 
The North Korean society is ageing. According to the United Nations (UN) Population Division
(2017) (see Figure 12), the number of people aged 65 and above will double by 2050, and will
continue to rise until 2100. 
[Fig. 12 about here]
Low birth  rates  associated  with  an  increase  in  life  expectancy are  the  major  causes  for  these
demographic  developments.  North  Korea  is  expected  to  witness  a  constant  increase  in  life
expectancy followed by decrease in the number of births (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
[Fig. 13 about here]
[Fig. 14 about here]
As shown in  Figure  15,  these  societal  changes  have  important  repercussions  for  public  policy
making. Different population pyramids need different policy responses (UNDP 2017). Needless to
say, this has also important consequences in terms of politics of inequality (Cerami 2013), politics
of anger management (Cerami 2015), as well as the associated distributive conflicts (Haggard and
Kaufman 2008, 2016). 
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[Fig. 15 about here]
As shown in Fig. 16, after a significant decrease in the deaths between the period 1950 to 1990, the
crude death rate of the North Korean population is expected to grow until 2100. However, this
trend, already negative, does not fully take into account future amenities of war and of nuclear
proliferation, such as those linked to famine and the increase in war-related fatalities and illnesses. 
[Fig. 16 about here]
A recent article in The Lancet, one of the world’s leading medical journals, has highlighted that
rapid  mass  privatization  has  been one of  the  most  crucial  determinants  of  differences  in  adult
mortality trends in post-communist  countries, accounting for up to 1 million lives. The authors
(Stuckler, King, & McKee 2009) have explained the main reason for this increase in mortality rates
as caused by the captured nature of privatized resources by oligarchs (see also Novokmet et al.
2017) and by other former communist party members (including their sons). Though real mortality
rates remained often a state secret during communism (Vlassov and Vishnevsky 2017), the captured
nature of resources has fostered further stages of political and administrative corruption. This has
led to the re-emergence of different mafia organizations, with a subsequent increase in inequality
and mortality rates.
Interestingly, the negative effects of rapid privatization were reduced if the social capital of citizens
was high. This was clearly the case of former members of the communist elites. Notwithstanding,
when more than 45 per cent of the population affected by rapid mass privatization was part of at
least  one  social  organization,  such  as  church  or  trade  union,  privatization  was  no  longer
significantly associated  with  increased  mortality  rates  (Stuckler,  King and McKee 2009).  Slow
privatization also helped to reduce mortality rates and vulnerabilities (Azarova et al. 2017). Who are
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then the real winners of contemporary North Korea’s buyngjing line? What patterns of community
integration (Vergeimeinschaftung)  and integration in the society (Vergesellschaftung)6 will arise in
North Korea?
Prices, Co-optation and the Mobilization of Anger
The 2017 nuclear missile ballistic crisis has done nothing more than crystallizing already existing
systemic  problems.  The  prolonged  drought  of  2017,  coupled  with  a  slow  increase  in  cereal
production since the fall of 1988-2001 (FAO 2017), has resulted in a subsequent growth in food
prices (see also Haggard and Noland 2007). This was followed by a set of new sanctions by the
international  community,  which  aimed at  stopping the  nuclear  proliferation  aspirations  of  Kim
Jong-un's North Korea. In order to limit the possible explosion of anger among the population, the
North Korean regime introduced a set of price stabilizing measures, as well as increased repression
for the illegal trade of goods. 
What kind of social pacifying strategies (divide and conquer, divide and pacify, unify and conquer
and unify and pacify, see Vanhuysse 2006; Cerami 2013) has the North Korean regime implemented
in order to calm the masses? This raises questions of how the dissent  voices of citizens could be
successfully reduced by the regime through redistributive social  policies so as to increase their
loyalty to the system and, thus, limiting their options for exit and protest (Hirschman 1970, 1978).
As  another  journalist  of  the  Daily NK has  ascertained,  “As  fuel  prices  have  been  fluctuating,
gasoline coupons have become popular items in Pyongyang's black markets. The merchants who
previously bought dozens of coupons have started offering them for sale as the prices began to rise”
(Ah 2017,  p.1).  Interesting  to  note  here  is  that  coupons  were  initially  issued  by  the  central
government, but also foreign currency enterprises can also issue them. They were mostly delivered
to high ranking officials and members of the cadres and could also be used in restaurants, resold in
6 For a discussion on Vergesellschaftung, see, for instance, Mau (2007).
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the black market or exchanged for dollars (Ah 2017). 
The absence of a clear social pacifying strategy of the regime (such as unify and conquer) might
have resulted in anger among the cadres, which could then have potentially crossed national borders
and territories, representing a threat to regime stability. In order to avoid this, the North Korean
regime  implemented a stricter control over the system of coupons, introducing a «politics of de-
mobilization of anger» (Ost 2009) centered on the co-optation of cadres. In the eyes of the regime,
this should also have resulted in the indirect co-optation of citizens. However, strange circles of
semi-loyalty around the leader were created. 
When  introducing  strategies  of  social  cooptation,  a  particular  attention  should  be  given  to
unintended consequences. Dividing the masses can result in events impossible to predict, such as
formation  of  new elites  and clienteles,  unexpected  civil  riots,  insurgencies,  deaths  of  innocent
people, etc. (anonymous source). As aptly described by Svolik (2011, p.1), ‘after a transition to
democracy, politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics
of  those  who  see  this  period  as  their  “one-time  opportunity  to  get  rich.”  After  repeatedly
disappointing  government  performance,  voters  may  come  to  believe  that  “all  politicians  are
crooks,” stop discriminating among them, to which politicians rationally respond by “acting like
crooks”’.  Svolik  calls  such  an  expectation-driven  social  mechanism  the  ‘trap  of  pessimistic
expectations’, whose consequences for the democratization process, as well as for the consolidation
of democratic institutions can be disastrous.
As discussed elsewhere (see Cerami 2013, esp.  ch.  9 and ch.  10),  poverty and the increase in
vertical and horizontal inequalities can be addressed as the primary causes of civil conflicts, but this
tells us nothing about how these driving forces turn into practical results. It becomes immediately
evident that the North Korean regime has seen in the absence of social  protection a key social
transmission mechanism of protest. When the first concessions became insufficient to pacify the
masses, as it happened during the Arab revolts (Cerami 2015), police and military repression mostly
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follows.  Whilst  in  my previous  book  I  discussed  “The  Exclusive  Origins  of  Dictatorship  and
Democracy”  (Cerami  2013),  I  did  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to  “The  Inclusive  Origins  of
Dictatorship and Democracy”. 
Co-optation – broadly understood as  the capacity of the ruling elite to bind strategic actors via
formal and informal institutions - becomes, in this context, an important mechanism of institutional
maintenance  (Cerami  2013,  p.194;  Merkel  and  Gerschewski  2011).  Commonly  employed  by
authoritarian leaders in the Middle East (Joshua 2011) to substitute democratic participation by
ensuring the inclusion of strategically important parts of the population into politics, co-optation is
more  often  applied  to  the  case  of  North  Korea,  especially  for  those  citizens  belonging  to  the
industrial-military complex and the foreign currency earning enterprises. When transactions occur
in  non-democratic  settings,  these  usually  take  place  on  an  open  do  ut  des  basis  between  the
autocrats and their ‘clients’, leading to sub-optimal results (Svolik 2012). 
To provide some more clearer examples (see Cerami 2013, pp. 94-96), there are several institutional
and social mechanisms of differential inclusion and exclusion that can simultaneously foster the
emergence and consolidation of both dictatorships and democracies. A first set of institutional and
social mechanisms responsible for hindering poverty-reduction and the overall human development
goals in the country had to do with the inheritance of status inequality. By restricting the chances for
successful  institutional  and  social  interactions  (such  as  social  mechanisms  of  boundary  de-
activation and de-brokerage; see MacAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), the inheritance of
status  inequality  limits,  through  institutional  lock-in  and  self-reinforcing  mechanisms,  the
possibility of autonomous self-advancement of the population. 
A second set of institutional and social mechanisms is related to the issue of lost childhood and the
need to invest in children and youths. As Esping-Andersen (2008) has shown, if not sufficiently
addressed by adequate political, economic and welfare institutions, the impact of social origins on
child  outcomes  tends  to  persist,  greatly  affecting  the  chances  of  the  economic  and  social
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development of a society. 
A third set of institutional and social mechanisms of inequality reproduction is concerned with the
cyclicity  of  poverty.  Through  a  self-sustaining  and  self-reinforcing  institutional  mechanism of
exclusion, poverty reduces the chances of the affected from accessing the most valuable resources,
often elitist institutions, such as good schools, universities, centers of excellence, better equipped
hospitals, safe neighborhoods and so on (Petersen 2009). 
A fourth set  of institutional and social  mechanisms is  associated with the presence of negative
cultural, ethnic or religious repertoires with particular reference to those that hindered access to key
positions by excluding individuals based on class, gender, race or ethnic origin. Sociological studies
within this topic are innumerable and a list of the most important articles or even books would fill
several hundred pages (see Cerami 2013). 
A final set of institutional and social mechanisms of exclusion concerned the access to political
power and associated local governance dynamics (Ostrom 1990, 2005). Excluding poor people from
education in the best universities implied not simply having less access to the labour market but also
having  fewer  chances  to  access  political  positions  in  democratic  ways.  Clearly,  when  all
institutional  doors  were  closed  by the  elites,  poor  people  turned  to  political  mobilization  and
eventually to violence to ensure the representation of their interests and access to the few power
positions available (Justino 2010).
In this context, a correct understanding of the facilitators of democratization becomes particularly
important,  especially  in  presence  of  state  fragility  where  conflict,  low  development  status,
vulnerability to endogenous and exogenous threats, and the lack of a developmental state capable of
addressing  the  emerging  socio-economic  problems  (such  as  those  related  to  technology  and
learning,  the  business-government  nexus  or  trade  politics)  in  a  consistent  way are  the  key
characteristics (Haggard 2018). The costs associated to the existence of ‘fragile’ states are enormous
and can affect the economic development and system stabilization possibilities of the countries for
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several years to come (Naudé et al 2011). Here, despite the persistence of some shortcomings, aid
for  democracy-enhancing  related  projects  represents  the  most  important  element  in  democracy
promotion (Burnell 2011) and consolidation (Resnick 2012), as an increasing number of studies
have recently and unequivocally shown. However, equally important is to understand past mistakes
made and the problems associated with past waves of system transformation.
Public Policy Administration and System Transformation in North Korea 
As mentioned, North Korea is a military-based State-Interfered Planned Market Economy, whose
dominant predatory mixed-capitalist mode of production and allocation of resources influences the
leading social relationships. This results in various forms of social segregation and exploitation. A
portfolio of different sources of formal and informal revenue affects the living conditions of the
population subjected to this political economy of war with growing insecurity that is very often
associated to extensive forms of patronage and clientelism. This, subsequently, leads to unexpressed
cadres and social conflicts (see also Gough 2004, Figure 1.3, p.32). North Korean markets are, in
this context, to be seen as social structures (see Beckert  et al. 2007) with unique social-patronage
relations.  As  it  often  happens  in  real-life  situations,  most  of  the  social  interactions  on  money
depend, and on money push (Bergsdorf et al. 2007). Government co-optation of civil society greatly
influences the patterns of system transformation.  Coupons for the  cadres,  sexy photos with the
smiling leader,  the monopolization of local  market  stands,  the introduction of compulsory cash
cards  for  workers,  special  privileges  for  scientists,  and  tolerance  for  oligarchs-like  real  estate
brokers are indicators of new forms of community and societal differentiation and de-differentiation
(Leibfried and Mau 2008. See also Radio Free Asia http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea). 
Which pathways to democratic transformation can be envisaged?  While it is certainly correct to
affirm that  history  matters in  political,  institutional,  economic,  cultural  and social  change  (see
Pierson 2004),  this  does not mean that the patterns of system transformation are already set in
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advance, as important institutional and societal adaptations, mutations and evolutions may occur
(Lewis and Steinmo 2012), significantly altering the make-up of a country. A better understanding
of the patterns of system transformation requires also an improved knowledge of the  relationship
that  exists  between fixed-immovable objects  (Pierson 1998) in  the public  policy administration
sphere  and the  dynamic  actions  of  public  policy administrators  (Farrel  and Shalizi  2012).  The
dichotomy between institutions and agency or, if one prefers, between  structure and  agency (see
Giddens 1984) is often misleading (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) when applied to regional settings
(de  Bruijn  et  al 2007),  and,  especially,  when  one  element  is  supposed  to  exclude  the  other
(Katznelson and Milner  2002).  Through a circular  process,  institutions influence the actions  of
actors, which, in turn, are capable of influencing the patterns of system transformation. The issue at
stake here is if a system transformation in North Korea must occur, how to deal with authoritarian
historical legacies, institutions, ideas and culture (see Kollmorgen et al. 2015). Another important
set of issues is whether democracy can be exported through bombing, and, consequently, whether
abrupt  institutional  change  in  public  policy  administration  is  to  be  preferred  to  gradual  or
evolutionary transformation (Lewis and Steinmo 2012).
Public Policy Administration and the Governance of War Desire
The  governance  of  war  desire  becomes,  in  this  context,  an  important  factor  for  public  policy
administration  stability  and  change.  Democratization  through  war  is  a  risky  endeavor  (Grimm
2015). The responsibility to protect, as defined by the Report of the International Commission on
Intervention  and State  Sovereignty (2001),  sets  some pre-conditions  necessary for  intervention,
among which the protection of populations from mass murders and genocides. The governance of
war desire is an additional necessity. 
As mentioned elsewhere (Carmel and Cerami 2011, p.10), “emotions (Elster 1999, 2009a,b) play a
central role in institutional and policy change, favouring the formation of specific beliefs (Rydgren
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2009)  and  preferences  (Freese  2009),  which,  in  turn,  structure  the  attitudes  of  citizens  and
institutional agents and, subsequently, limit the set of opportunities available (Petersen 2009). For
Jon Elster (1999, 2007, 2009a,b), the distinction between  rational and  irrational behaviour  is a
trivial  misunderstanding  (see  also  Damasio  1994),  because,  as  Raymond  Boudon  has  also
emphasized (2003), reason is often subjected to emotions, but emotions often rely on reasoning to
crystallize. As argued by Frank (1988), passions often serve our interests in a co-producing and self-
sustaining process of interest-maximizing preference formation and vice versa (Elster 2007).
Bombing is expensive for the state budget. It is also a lucrative business. But when no clear idea of
future system transformation pathways exists, it becomes, additionally, a suicidal political exercise7.
Similarly, North Korea's nuclear program has been estimated at $1 billion to $3 billion. According
to CNBC estimations, each “Scud costs between $1 million and $2 million; each Musudan from $3
million to $6 million” (Source: CNBC 2017). In September 2017, the cost of one kilogram of rice
was around KPW 6,000 that corresponded to approximately $0.75 (exchange rate $1 = 8086 KPW
28.9.2017). This meant North's nuclear program costed between 1 million tons of rice and 4 million
tons  of rice. Each Scud costed between 1.3 thousand tons of rice and 2.6 thousand tons of rice; each
Musudan  from 4  thousand tons  of  rice  and  8  thousand  of  rice;  and  each  submarine-launched
ballistic missile at 6.6 thousand tons of rice and 13.3 thousand tons of rice. Over a total population
of 24,851,267 inhabitants, North Korea's nuclear program, as mentioned before estimated between
$1 billion and $3 billion, corresponded to 54 kilos of rice per capita and 161 kilos of rice per capita.
This, subsequently, corresponded to 150 grams and 450 grams of rice per day for each inhabitant
(see also Daily NK 2017, p.12).  It comes then as no surprise that the patterns of North Korean
inclusion greatly changed after the 2018 unofficial peace talks with South Korea and China during
7 The cost of a simple US air-to-air AIM-7 Sparrow missile is, for example, around US$ 150,000
per unit, whilst the RIM-161 standard antiballistic missile 3 (SM-3) costs between US$ 9 and 24
million per unit.
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the winter  Olympics,  since they corresponded to more long-term political  objectives  of system
stability and peace.
However,  continuous  stop-and-go  phases  in  nuclear  disarmament  spilt-over  in  embargos  and
international trade restrictions, which resulted in a compression of human and economic activity,
with subsequent reduction in prosperity shining and living standards. Kim Il Sung's legacy (Kim
Jong Un's grandfather) of North Korea as a “nuclear-armed state” (Jin 2018), associated with fears
of invasion and international trade dependence were probably behind the difficulties in the round-
table talks.  This happened despite Kim Jong-Un's expressed desire for denuclearization,  though
delayed (Sik 2018).  In  October  2018,  the  exchange rate  against  the  US dollar  increased,  food
availability decreased because of bad weather (e.g. Typhoons) (Daily NK 2018; FAO 2018) and
trade  restrictions.  Price  subsidies  to  food and to  gas  were  clearly not  a  sufficient  measure  for
covering the costs of nuclear proliferation.
Conclusions
Size matters,  some claim. Others emphasize the usage.  Contrasting theories. The North Korean
ballistic missile Taepodong 2 is presumably bigger than the Taepodong 1 with a wider scope of
action.  Its  real goals,  however,  are still  unclear,  but, presumably,  they are disastrous for peace-
building. The 'metric us' (Das metrische Wir)8 of North Korea, where Kim Jong-un's regime must
quantify  each  citizen  through  a  parametrization  of  his/her  loyalty  to  the  system  seems  to  be
dangerously linked to a  politics of military spending9 in the  buyngjing line  of political economy,
which might lead through a self-reinforcing social mechanism to further nuclear escalation.  
In Choice Architecture, 2017 Nobel Prize Winner Richard H. Thaler with his colleagues Cass R.
8On the concept of Das metrische Wir ('the metric us'), see Mau (2017).
9 On the politics of military spending and the assumptions behind defense expenses, see, for instance, El Gasto Militar
(Gutiérrez 1994).
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Sunstein and John P. Balz (2014) define the NUDGES approach. It comprises of six main principles
for  making  good  policy  choices:  iNcentives,  Understand  mappings,  Defaults,  Give  feedback,
Expect  error,  and  Structure  complex  choices.  iNcentives refers  to  prices  and  incentives.  More
specifically,  it  has  to  do  with:  who  uses,  who  chooses,  who  pays,  who  profits  of  (and  by)  a
determined policy choice.  Understand mappings concerns the right policy choices that lead to the
welfare of society. This, for example, involves selecting which policies to choose among a wide
variety  of  possible  equally  suitable  alternatives.  Defaults means  avoiding  the  least  pathway of
resistance when this default option (doing nothing or no change) leads to negative results (Thaler et
al. 2014, p. 430). In complex systems, Give feedback is a necessary endeavor to avoid mistakes.
What rose the admiration of baseball fans and gives them joy is often the individual achievements
of players. But the player there does not stand alone at the plate, because s/he is part of a team.
Looks, throws, catches, hustles are all elements part of one big team. Giving feedback to players
becomes, in this context, necessary to ensure the consistency of their game choices (anonymous
quote).  Expect  error is  a  fifth  important  element  in  order  to  improve  a  policy-maker’s  choice
architecture. If a player goes out there for himself/herself without thinking about the team (or caring
about the team), he or she gets nowhere. The team must fit, players must expect errors and learn
how to  deal  with  them.  Structure  complex  choices is  hence  the  sixth  and final  element  of  the
NUDGES approach.  It  involves  the  necessity  of  adopting  different  strategies  for  dealing  with
complex  problems  and  choosing  the  best  alternative  with  more  trade-offs.  Structure  complex
choices means, in brief, having in mind a structure of alternative suitable strategies.
This  discussion  includes  also  the  ways  in  which  public  policy  administrators  deal  with  the
Descartes’ Error (Damasio 1994) – that is to say – the tensions that exist between their emotions
and ir/rational behaviors. In other words, their Feeling of What Happens (Damasio 2000), as well as
the  desires’ contraints  that  public  policy  actors  face  in  their  everyday  life,  especially  when
socialized  in  determined  institutions.  As Thaler  and  Mullainathan  (2001)  have  correctly
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emphasized,  departures  from  pre-existing  ir/rationalities  are  not  rare  (on  path-departures,  see
also Cerami and Vanhuysse 2009; Cerami 2013). In this context, it is not extraordinary to adopt “the
rule of the thumb as a way to economize on cognitive faculties” (Thaler and Mullainathan 2001,
p.3).
In the case of the North Korean public policy administration diatribe,  an important issue is,  to
paraphrase Thaler and Mullainathan (2001, p.2), whether it makes sense to follow “dumb money”,
as in the case of nuclear proliferation activities promoted by the industrial-military complex, versus
following “smart  money”,  as in the case of ensuring a correct functioning in the public  policy
domain.
As  mentioned  previously,  the  costs  associated  with  nuclear  proliferation  and  war  escalation
activities  are  enormous,  as  introduced by  the buyngjing line  of  political  economy. These
incalculable costs include political costs, economic costs, cultural costs and social costs that public
policy administrators are called to deal with in some way with limited budget possibilities. The
relational elective afﬁnities between nuclear proliferation and effective public policy administration
must still be clarified.
To  conclude,  the  ancient  Greeks  had  a  nuanced  conception  of  time:  Cronos referred  to  the
chronological quantification of time and to its sequentiality – or put it simply – of how many hours
have passed. Kairos referred instead to the right or opportune moment, for example, when it is the
right time to speak or to act. In our everyday lives, the “rythm of timing” (Gelang 2013) has to do
with the rythm of “now”.  The feeling of “now” can also be understood in terms of “real-time
impermanence” (Peary 2016), which means occurrences at Time 1 (t1) that mutate at Time 2 (t2)
(just  think,  for  example,  to  your  first  kiss  or  to  the  birth  of  a  child). In  the  public  policy
administration domain, timing and sequentiality of reforms (see Pierson 2004) mean for policy-
analysts,  as  well  as  for  public  policy  administrators  exactly  choosing  the  right  moment  to
implement the opportune reforms. It also means having a feeling of what happens. Understanding
21
the negative incentives, the  mappings (that is- the right policy choices that lead to the welfare of
society), the defaults of these choices, the negative feedbacks, the errors, and the obsolete structure
of complex choices linked to the buyngjing line of political economy remains crucial.
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ANNEX
34
Fig. 1 Korean Peninsula 3 January 2018
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
Fig. 2 Mount Paektu 
Source: Landsat 8, 16 October 2018.
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Fig 3 The Night Lights of North Korea 2012
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig 4 The Night Lights of North Korea 2016
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig 5 The Night Lights of North Korea March 2017
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig 6 The Night Lights of North Korea March 2018
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig 7 The Night Lights of Pyongyang 2012
NOTE:  Fig. 7a, Fig. 8a, Fig. 9a, Fig. 10a  display the changes in color luminosity and the single
value of this luminosity plotted in a 3-D environment.
Fig 7a Color Display Graph Pyongyang 2012
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig. 8 The Night Lights of Pyongyang 2016
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
Fig 8a Color Display Graph Pyongyang 2016
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig. 9 The Night Lights of Pyongyang March 2017
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
Fig 9a Color Display Graph Pyongyang March 2017
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig. 10 The Night Lights of Pyongyang March 2018
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
Fig 10a Color Display Graph Pyongyang March 2018
Source: SUOMI-NPP VIIRS (2018). Available at: https://jointmission.gsfc.nasa.gov/viirs.html 
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Fig. 11 The Lights of Pyongyang: Economic Well-Being by Zone (May 2018)
Source:  ©Nasa  2018.  SUOMI-NPP  satellite.
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/NPP/main/index.html Author's calculations and visualization.
False-Color Imaging. ©Alfio Cerami
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Figure 12 Total Population by broad age group 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Figure 13 Life expectancy at birth by sex 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
Fig. 14 North Korea Number of Births (both sexes)
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Figure 15 Population Pyramids 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website. 
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Fig. 16 Crude Death Rate North Korea 1950-2100
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017).
World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data and figure acquired via website.
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